Many of us have been relieved that President Trump and Mr Pete Hegseth, the United States Secretary of War, have cancelled a promise. They decided not to livestream the execution by firing squad of Nidal Hasan.

Some years ago, he had killed 13 unarmed United States soldiers.

The unease at the livestreaming was heightened by the knowledge that Hasan sees his death as martyrdom for his cause and would welcome publicity for it. The sight of the killing of a man who is paralysed and cannot stand would have made its public viewing even more repulsive.

The Australian Government had echoed public opinion in promising to prevent the execution from being shown in Australia, partly because of its potential effect on children.

A decisive change

Although the execution will not now be livestreamed, the initial pledge to do so deserves reflection. It marked what would have been confirmation of a decisive change in the attitude to human life.

The strongest argument made against the public execution, which I share, was that it lacked due respect for human life.

I would argue further that the fact that such a proposal could be made by the United States Government shows that support for such respect is precarious. Once enshrined in law and in public attitudes, it has been weakened by cultural movements over the last century and by consequent changes in law.

Although there is still strong opposition to capital punishment and even more to its being carried out in public, acceptance of the value of human life which underpins such opposition has been weakened as priority has been given to other values.

We rejected the livestream.
The harder task
is to reject the thinking
that made it possible.

An inalienable value

The value of human life was until recently anchored in the conviction that each human being is unique and that the value of their life is inalienable by virtue of being human. The value of human life is universal, independent of race, wealth, political views and behaviour.

The implications of this conviction are spelled out in human rights and in the resolution of conflicts when rights are in conflict with one another or with the good of society.

The right to freedom of movement, for example, may be modified in times of plague, and the right to freedom of speech modified by others’ right to a good reputation. Most democracies, however, have come to see the right to life, even of condemned murderers, as non-negotiable.

The path to this conviction has been long.

From the practice and tolerance of bloody executions supported by kingdoms and churches, it has led to a preference for imprisonment and forms of punishment that encourage personal reform, and finally to the rejection of capital punishment.

More recently, both churches and nations have come to reject the defence of capital punishment as opposed to the inalienable right to life of all human beings.

The high value of human life has always been embodied in legislation and in public attitudes that emphasised the human dignity of all human beings and its practical consequences.

These included polite customs of not speaking ill of the dead, the laws that protected life from actions to end it in its beginnings and its endings, and the regulations about declaring and fighting war that protected the lives of non-combatants.

‘In this culture, however, respect for human life based on the inalienable dignity of each person is under threat. It is weakened by the overriding right of individuals to choose and give priority to their own values. The value of human beings and of their lives can then in practice be measured by their reputation, their race, religion, political actions and views, or their popularity and their usefulness.’

Removing the guardrails

These guardrails, however, have been removed in our present culture that identifies the dignity of human beings with the right of each individual to choose their own values and to pursue their individual dreams.

This gives precedence to the freedom of the individual and to the competitive rights of groups within society over its shared values.

The support for and legislation to allow abortion and assisted dying have reflected these values. They have also found expression in the uncompromising promotion of the rights of minority groups in society and the cancelling of their opponents from public conversation.

I do not wish here to argue against these changes to law, still less to question the character or motivation of those who have given decisive precedence to individual freedom of choice and to the consequent changes in law.

Individual freedom is an important value. The emphasis on the freedom of individuals and so of minority groups can also encourage the protection of the unprotected.

In this culture, however, respect for human life based on the inalienable dignity of each person is under threat. It is weakened by the overriding right of individuals to choose and give priority to their own values.

The value of human beings and of their lives can then in practice be measured by their reputation, their race, religion, political actions and views, or their popularity and their usefulness.

Soldiers on opposing sides may no longer have the right as human beings to live if captured. Prisoners may be sentenced to death and their execution be performed in a way that strips them of any claim to a shared humanity.

Our shared humanity

The proposed public execution of the man who killed United States soldiers highlighted the change from respect for persons because of their shared humanity to a more conditional respect based on their allegiances and actions.

It echoed the choreography of Roman executions, which were designed to deny the condemned and their supporters any claim to a shared humanity.

Its widespread rejection suggests that respect for our shared humanity still holds considerable force. That respect remains, however, under threat.

• Andrew Hamilton SJ is the consulting editor of Eureka Street. and a writer at Jesuit Social Services.
• First published in Eureka Street. Republished with permission.